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A thirty by eighteen inch towel marked "Medical Department U.S.
Army" was left in the stomach of a serviceman during an abdominal
operation in a military hospital. The United States Supreme Court
in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), denied this service-
man the right to sue the federal government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' A military doctor left surgical sutures in the kidney area
of an enlisted man. This negligence necessitated a second operation
in which the kidney was removed. This enlisted man was denied the
right to sue the military doctor personally. Bailey v. Buskirk, 345 F.
2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965). Both of these cases appear to involve flagrant
acts of negligent medical practice. If both the doctors and the service-
men had been civilians, the patients would undoubtedly have been
permitted to bring civil tort actions against these doctors and medical
personnel.
This article will present an analysis of two basic questions arising
out of a reading of the above noted decisions: 1) Should the service-
man 2 have the right to sue either the federal government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act or the military doctor personally? 2) Is
there any need for a serviceman to bring either of these suits?
II. THE RIGHT TO SUE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The reasons for denying a serviceman the right to sue either the
federal government or the military doctor personally are outlined in
a series of cases beginning with Feres v. United States, supra. In
this case the United States Supreme Court inferred the following
reasons for denying the serviceman recovery.
A. The Serviceman's Available Compensation
The Court noted 3 that the primary purpose in enacting the Federal
Tort Claims Act was to extend a remedy in tort to certain of those
who were without remedy against the sovereign, i.e., the United States
Government. Since military personnel can avail themselves of a com-
prehensive system of compensation, it was the Court's opinion that the
provisions of this act are not applicable to servicemen.
' Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1964) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.)
2 The term "servicemen" as used in this article includes personnel of the Army,
ir Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
3 340 U.S. at 140.
The Court in the prior case of Brooks v. United States,4 however,
allowed a serviceman to recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act
even though he was already receiving disability benefits from the Vet-
erans Administration. The only specification required by the Court in
this case was that the amount receivable under the servicemen's benefit
laws should be deducted or taken into consideration when he obtains
judgment under the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 The Court explicitly
stated that:
provisions in other statutes for disability payments to service-
men, and gratuity payments to their survivors, 38 U.S.C. §701,
indicate no purpose to forbid tort actions under the Tort Claims
Act. Unlike the usual workman's compensation statute, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. 905, there is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the
veterans' laws which provide for exclusiveness of remedies."
The Court in the Brooks case also placed a different interpretation
on the Federal Tort Claims Act by saying that the terms of the statute
"provide for jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence
brought against the United States." The Court noted that it was "not
persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen.'-
The Court in the Feres case, however, distinguished that case from
Brooks on the grounds that the serviceman's injuries in the latter case
had nothing to do with his relationship to the military service." The
injuries to Brooks resulted from a collision between a military vehicle
driven by a civilian employee of the United States Army, and an auto-
mobile driven by Brooks, who was on furlough at the time. The col-
lision, furthermore, did not occur on government lands. The Court in
Feres interpreted the Brooks case as being applicable only to cases in
which the serviceman's injuries were incurred while not in the line of
duty.9 The term "any claim" appears to be interpreted by the Court
in the Feres case to mean "any claim other than that of a serviceman
who is acting in the line of duty." Since the Feres case is the more
recent case, and since it has not been overruled, the term "any claim"
of the Federal Tort Claims Act will have the above qualification.
As a reason for denying a serviceman the right to sue the federal
government, can the Court in the Feres case take notice of the fact that
4 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
5 Id. at 53-54.
6Id. at 53.
7Id. at 51.
8 340 U.S. at 146.
9 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1964) lists thirteen exceptions to the federal government's
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §2680(j) (1964) sets
out the following exception: "Any claim arising out of the combatant activi-
ties of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during the time of
war." The Court in the Feres case stated that claims arising out of line of




the serviceman already has available to him a comprehensive system
of compensation? If a serviceman can avail himself of certain Veterans'
benefits regardless of whether his permanent injuries or disability oc-
curred as an incident to his military service, he should not be denied
the right to sue the federal government in one case and not in the
other.
B. Choice of Habitat
A basis for determining the federal government's liability, the
cases applying the Federal Tort Claims Act apply the substantive law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.' 0 The second reason
for denying the serviceman the right to recover under the claims act
was his lack of freedom to choose his own habitat."
The distinction between the Feres case and Brooks may be justified
by this second reason. A serviceman on furlough has the freedom to
go where he wishes. The jurisdiction in which the government's liability
will be determined, thus, will not be restricted by the military.
A Federal District Court in Grigalauskas v. United States,2 how-
ever, allowed a serviceman's dependent to recover under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. The dependent's injuries had resulted from a mili-
tary doctor's failure to read the label on an ampule of medication and
thus his consequent failure to dilute this solution with water. This
incident occurred in a military hospital. As a result of the doctor's
negligence, it was determined that the dependent would never be able
to retain employment and would also have great difficulty in bearing
children.
One of the distinctions made between this case and the Feres case
was that the serviceman's dependent "is free to choose his own habitat
and thereby limit the jurisdiction in which it will be possible for federal
activities to cause him injury."' 3 The practical question is whether the
serviceman's wife and his minor dependents are in fact free to choose
their own habitat. When a serviceman is stationed within the United
States, the serviceman's family often accompanies him to his place of
duty. The military, in many instances, provides housing for the service-
man and his family. It could be said that in many instances the de-
pendent's choice of habitat would be controlled by the habitat of the
serviceman himself.
C. Creating New Liability
The Court in the Feres case stated that the purpose for enacting
the Federal Tort Claims Act was to lift the veil of sovereign im-
028 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1964).
"1340 U.S. at 142-143.
12103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951).
13 Id. at 549,
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munity from the federal government for certain tort actions. 14 The
claims act, it was further pointed out, was not enacted to create new
liability but to remove immunity, i.e., to make the federal government
liable as if it were a private person.'3 If a serviceman were allowed
to bring suit under the claims act, the Court maintained that it would
be creating new liability on the federal government, because "no Ameri-
can law . . . ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence,
against either his superior officers or the Government he is serving."'
16
This statement is subject to some qualification. The Court apparently
did not view Brooks in the Brooks case as a "serviceman" at the time
he was injured. A United States Court of Appeals in Feeley v. United
StateS'7 stated that "the only reason the plaintiff in Brooks was able
to maintain his action at all, in light of Feres, was that at the time of
the injury he was made in the posture of a private citizen than a
serviceman.""' It appears that what the Court in the Feres case meant
by "soldier" was a "soldier acting in the line of duty."
The basic question, thus, remains: Did Congress intend to limit
the term "any claim" in the Federal Tort Claims Act to refer to any
claim but those of a serviceman who is acting in the line of duty. If
this is what Congress intended, the Supreme Court in the Feres case
interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act correctly; if not, further
clarification is needed.
III. THE RIGHT TO SUE PERSONALLY
A United States Court of Appeals, in the case of Bailey v. Buskirk, 9
affirmed the dismissal of an action in which an enlisted man was
attempting to sue a military doctor personally for injuries resulting
from forgotten surgical sutures. The court relied on the policy reasons
set out in the Feres case.
The court specifically reasoned that the serviceman would be com-
pensated for his injuries occurring while he was acting in the line of
duty.20 This reason is questionable in view of the availability of com-
pensation in both the Feres and Brooks cases.
The suits of enlisted men against superior officers, the court also
noted, are not yet within the American legal concept.2' The reasons for
granting public officials as well as military doctors immunity from
being sued personally have been adequately set forth in the case of
Gamage v. Peal.2
'4340 U.S. at 139-140.
15 Id. at 141.
16 Ibid.
17 337 F. 2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964).is Id. at 933.
19 345 F. 2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
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The policy underlying the rule of immunity is -that government
officials owe their duty to the public at large and the Govern-
ment and not to the individual citizen.. . . If the act complained
of is within the scope of an official's duties as defined by law,
he should not be subjected to the harassment of civil litigation.23
The court goes on to point out that this rule is applicable to military
officers and military doctors. 24 This case involved an action brought
by an Air Force officer who alleged that an Air Force medical officer
and a civilian contract psychiatrist had made false statements con-
cerning his physical and mental condition in order to have him invol-
untarily released from active duty. It is, therefore, a case of an in-
tentional wrong rather than that of negligence. However, this reason-
ing may be applicable in negligence cases involving personal suits
against a military doctor.
IV. THE NEED To SUE
Does a serviceman need to sue either the federal government or
the military doctor personally? As in any tort action, the primary pur-
pose of a medical malpractice suit is to provide compensation to those
who have been injured through another's negligence. Since the service-
man cannot maintain an action for his injuries caused by the military
doctor's negligence or malpractice, the question arises: Will the service-
man be compensated for permanent injuries resulting from military
medical negligence as a civilian would be in a civil suit?
A serviceman who has been permanently disabled is assured of
both free hospitalization 2' and military pay26 while he remains on active
duty. After his honorable discharge from the military service, he can
be assured of certain pay allowances from either the military itself 27
or the Veterans Administration .2  The allowances from the military
are, for the most part, based on a certain per centum of his prior service
base pay. If a serviceman has a permanent disability of less than thirty
percent as computed by the Veterans Administration's disability rat-
ings and has served less than eight years in the military service, he is
entitled to a severance pay of twice the amount of his base pay.2 9 If his
disability is above thirty percent, he is entitled to receive from the mili-
tary monthly payments which do not exceed seventy-five percent of his
base pay.30 He, and in some cases his dependent or dependents, may
avail themselves of additional Veterans Administration benefits which
will vary according to the degree of his disability.31 The serverance
23 Id. at 388.
24 Id. at 389.
25 10 U.S.C. §1074(a) (1964).
2637 U.S.C. §§201-204 (1964).
27 10 U.S.C. §§1201-1212, 1401 (1964).
28 38 U.S.C. §§314, 315, 334, 335 (1964).
29 10 U.S.C. §§1203, 1206, 1212 (1964).
30 1 U.S.C. §§1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1401 (1964)..
3138 U.S.C. §§314, 315, 334, 335 (1964). (The amount of compensation). 38
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disability pay received from the military itself will be deducted from
any compensation for the same disability to which he may become en-
titled to from the Veterans Administration. 32 The adequacy of the
compensation given by the Veterans Administration, however, is
pointed out in the United States Code when it specifically states that
the ratings of the Veterans Administration "shall be based, as far as
practicable, upon the average impairments of earning capacity resulting
from such injuries in civilian occupations. 33
It is important to note that the permanently disabled military medi-
cal patient is always assured of some relief. This relief is available by
the mere fact that he was permanently disabled while on active military
duty. He does not have to prove negligence on anyone's part. A civilian
patient, on the other hand, receives compensation only after he has
proved that the civilian doctor or his assistants were negligent. A civil-
ian, thus, cannot be assured of any compensation. The analysis of some
123 verdicts involving civilian doctor's malpractice suits by Jury Ver-
dict Research, Inc. indicated that only in twenty-four percent of these
verdicts was the plaintiff or patient able to recover.3 4 The neglected
patient was allowed recovery in forty-eight percent of fifty verdicts in-
volving suits against hospitals.3 5
V. CONCLUSION
Servicemen cannot, at the present time, recover in suits brought
either against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act or against the military doctor personally for injuries caused by
military medical negligence. Even. if they were able to sue either the
federal government or the military doctor personally, however, it is
questionable whether they need to bring such suits because compensa-
tion is available. Two factors which would make them hesitate in bring-
ing such a suit are the expenses of litigation and the limited chance of
recovery.
ALLEN J. HENDRICKS
U.S.C. §3001 (1964) specifies that.a form prescribed by the Veterans Ad-
ministration must be filed with the Veterans Administration in order for a
person to be entitled to Veterans' .benefits. Chapter 51-61 of Title 38 of the
U.S. Code (§§3001-3505) set forth the administrative procedures for making
a claim for the Veterans Administration's disability compensation.
32 38 U.S.C. §§3104-3105 (1964).
33 38 U.S.C. §355 (1964).-
4 Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,, 3 Personal Injury Evaluation Handbooks 403
(N.D.).
35 Id. at 407.. .
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